The role of the organization structure in the diffusion of innovations by Sáenz-Royo, C. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Role of the Organization Structure in the
Diffusion of Innovations
Carlos Sáenz-Royo1, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro2*, Yamir Moreno2,3,4
1Centro Universitario de la Defensa. 50090 Zaragoza, Spain, 2 Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of
Complex Systems. University of Zaragoza, 50009 Zaragoza, Spain, 3 Departamento de Física Teórica.
University of Zaragoza, 50009 Zaragoza, Spain, 4 Complex Networks and Systems Lagrange Lab, Institute
for Scientific Interchange, Turin 10126, Italy
* cgracia@bifi.es
Abstract
Diffusion and adoption of innovations is a topic of increasing interest in economics, market
research, and sociology. In this paper we investigate, through an agent based model, the
dynamics of adoption of innovative proposals in different kinds of structures. We show that
community structure plays an important role on the innovation diffusion, so that proposals
are more likely to be accepted in homogeneous organizations. In addition, we show that the
learning process of innovative technologies enhances their diffusion, thus resulting in an im-
portant ingredient when heterogeneous networks are considered. We also show that social
pressure blocks the adoption process whatever the structure of the organization. These re-
sults may help to understand how different factors influence the diffusion and acceptance of
innovative proposals in different communities and organizations.
Introduction
Innovation feeds social and economic progress and drives progress through enhanced efficien-
cy [1–3], costs [4–6], and the quality of the products [7]. Innovation includes ideas, values,
goods, services, technologies, processes, etc. that emerge and are disseminated both in markets,
organizations and within social systems in general. Whether an innovation is effective or not
depends on whether it can be assimilated by the socio-economic system it is designed for. This
will be more or less complicated, depending on the setting in which it is disseminated. In mar-
kets, decisions to adopt the innovation and to commit the resources required to gain access to
the product and use it for its intended purpose are normally taken by one and the same person.
In organizations, on the other hand, the specialization of duties and distribution of authority
and decision-making among various jobs mean that each stage in the innovation assimilation
process may be carried out by different people, and this demands a greater level of coordina-
tion. The dissemination of innovation in social complex systems can therefore be described as
a process of a succession of decisions regarding adoption forming groups of people, or markets,
else it can be described as a process of internal diffusion throughout the implementation stage
in organisations [8].
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This paper examines the assimilation of innovation in social systems as a decentralized pro-
cess. In such processes, early stage is key to the assimilation of innovation. At this early stage,
either members unanimously accept the innovation or they continue with the status quo.
When adoption and implementation are produced in separate stages a previous consensus in
favour of innovation will simplify the subsequent implementation stage since the people who
will need to be involved at a later date are the same ones that previously came out in favour of
adopting it. The use of Agent Based Models (ABM) as a methodological tool for the study of
social phenomena provides useful insights about the fundamental causal mechanisms at work
in social systems [9–11]. The large-scale macroscopic effects of simple forms of microscopic so-
cial interaction are very often surprising and generally hard to anticipate, such as the diffusion
of information, emergence of norms, coordination of conventions, or participation in
collective action.
The traditional literature on the adoption and dissemination of innovation has been heavily
influenced by the epidemiological models for the contagion of diseases and pathologies in
human groups, adapted to the social environment (see, e.g., [12], extensions like [13] and the
subsequent introduction of the model in complex Networks [14–18]). Our work differs from
the models based on epidemiological studies in several respects. First of all, people in the mar-
ket o in the organization take binary decisions, positioning themselves either for or against an
innovation, with relevant information reaching them from within their group of influence.
Their stance is not firm until a favorable consensus is obtained. Meanwhile, the same person
can change their position once or various times, i.e., go from being in favor of the innovation
to being against it and vice versa while there is someone in their environment that disagrees. In
the likelihood of opting for one alternative or another, on the one hand we consider the posi-
tions in favor or against the innovation expressed by other people within the radius of influence
of the person concerned (the influence is weighted according to the social pressure exercised by
the group over the individual according to the culture that is accepted by the members); and on
the other, individual value attributed to such innovation. The model presented here allows for
interaction between individuals connected to learn at a ratem, which modifies the performance
attributed to the status quo and innovation. This single interaction take place if the difference
between partners’ performances is less than a threshold . The individual character of the per-
formance recognizes the existence of diversity in skills and knowledge of the different people in
the group. The skill and knowledge determine the performance of each individual with respect
to the two alternatives, influencing its decision. In the more conventional models for dissemi-
nating innovation, however, adoption boils down to making decisions concerning use or pur-
chase: those who adopt an innovation by, for instance, purchasing a new product for the first
time, are then classified as adopters forevermore and only admit peer pressure conducive to the
adoption and never in favor of the status quo.
Secondly, in this paper the structure of the network articulating the internal workings of the
members of the organization or the market has a very important role. The network structure
implies that the likelihood of a person being in favor of an innovation will vary depending on
their position in the network. Furthermore, the network structure chosen will determine the
final outcome of the initiation stage measured by the greater or lesser probability of the consen-
sus being in favor of the innovation, and by the time needed to reach such a consensus. In this
respect, one relevant factor in this study is the comparison of probabilities and times needed
for consensus under various organizational o market structures, including Hierarchical graphs,
lattice graphs, Erdös-Rényi (E.R.) networks [19], Scale-free networks [20], Stars and
Complete graphs.
The results of the simulations show that the hierarchy is the formal structure that gives
greater probabilities of reaching a consensus in favor of innovation. This is the case for
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practically the whole range of possible differences in the economic value attributed to innova-
tion with respect to the status quo, and for both large and small-sized social structures. The dif-
ferences are greater when the relative performance of the innovation on the status quo is not
very large. Nevertheless, despite this higher probability of success regarding other topologies,
hierarchy is the structure that requires more time to reach a favorable consensus. As is well
known, time has a cost (referred to in economy as opportunity cost), established by the profit-
ability of its alternative use. On the other hand, the hierarchical appears as a very stable struc-
ture, showing a lower sensitivity to changes in the parameters of the model. ER and BA
structures give a very low probability of adoption for small innovation performance with re-
spect to the status quo and are especially sensitive to changes in the rate of learning and social
pressure. However, they present an remarkable advantage in the time needed to achieve favor-
able consensus as compared with a hierarchical graph.
The model
Let I = {1, 2, . . ., N} be the set of nodes in a social system structure: each node represents an in-
dividual or a team of several individuals under a common working method (whether subject to
discipline or reached by consensus). For each node j 2 I there is, at least, another node i 2 I,i
6¼ j to which it is connected; the graph of relationships is specified by a (N × N) symmetric adja-
cency matrix A defined as Aij = 1 whenever i is directly connected to j in the social structure, or
Aij = 0 otherwise. We define the influence set of node j as the collection of nodes that are direct-
ly connected to it: Hj = {i 2 IjAij = 1}. In the same way, the degree kj of node j is the number of
nodes directly connected to it: kj ¼ cardðHjÞ ¼
PN
i¼0 Aij.
Each node i 2 I has knowledge of each working method. Let Rit be the performance of node
i at time t provided by the conventional method (status quo) and, in the same way, let Rit be
the node i’s performance provided by the new method (innovation). In addition, each node i is
characterized by a variable si (the strategy) that takes the value sit ¼ 1 if the node i supports the
innovation at time t, or sit ¼ 0 otherwise. Let ait be the number of nodes connected to i that sup-
port the innovation at time t, and let bit be the number of i’s neighbors that support the status
quo:
ait ¼
XN
j¼1
sjtAij:
bit ¼
XN
j¼1
j1 sjtjAij ¼ ki  ait
ð1Þ
Given two nodes (i, j) mutually connected, i having adopted the innovation and j having not
(i.e., sit ¼ 1; sjt ¼ 0), we establish that they can interact with each other by exchanging knowl-
edge (and exchanging methods) only if the performance difference between the two nodes is
contained in an interval :
j Rit  Rjt j<  ; ð2Þ
resulting in mutual learning. When condition 2 is satisfied, we define the link (i, j) as feasible.
This threshold  introduces a condition for mutual benefit: while high values of  allow altruism
(i.e., people with high performance help people with very low performance without expecting
anything in return), low values of  only allow win-win relationships.
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Initial conditions
The system begins with a number ρ of randomly distributed nodes (the initial adopters) that
adopt the innovation from the first moment t = 0, while the other nodes are supporters of the
status quo. The performance provided by the status quo is randomly distributed between the
nodes according to a gaussian distribution centered in R = 1 with variance σ. Only the initial
adopters obtain more performance from the new method, for these nodes the performance
provided by the innovation is distributed according to a gaussian centered in R with variance
σ, while for the rest of the nodes (i.e., the supporters of the status quo) the efficiency of both
methods is the same. Then, the quotient R/R represents the innovation performance value
(i.e., the innovation technical superiority).
Explicitly, at t = 0, each node i 2 I, with probability ρ/N, adopts the innovation (sit¼0 ¼ 1)
and its performances are randomly assigned according to the following distributions:
pðRit¼0 ¼ zÞ ¼
1
s
ffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p eðz1Þ
2
2s2 ;
pðRit¼0 ¼ zÞ ¼
1
s
ffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p eðzR
Þ2
2s2 :
ð3Þ
Otherwise, that is, with probability 1−(ρ/N), node i supports the status quo (sit¼0 ¼ 0) and
its performances are given by:
pðRit¼0 ¼ zÞ ¼
1
s
ffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p eðz1Þ
2
2s2 ; Rit¼0 ¼ Rit¼0 : ð4Þ
Dynamics
At each dynamical step, each node chooses (if available) a random feasible neighbor with oppo-
site strategy, such that a given node interacts only once at most per step. Then, a time step con-
sists of at most N/2 interactions, and each interaction takes place between two nodes (i, j) with
different strategies (without loss of generality, sit ¼ 1; sjt ¼ 0). During the process of learning
each node shares information on the adopted method, so that a node may improve its perfor-
mance on the non-adopted method, provided that the opposite node has greater performance
on it. The increment is proportional to the difference in performances:
Rjt ¼ Rjt þmðRit  Rjt Þ HðRit  Rjt Þ ;
Rit ¼ Rit þmðRjt  RitÞ HðRjt  RitÞ ;
ð5Þ
wherem is a parameter that models the learning ratio by modulating the performance incre-
ment resulting from the information exchange: the higherm, the greater the increment in per-
formance. H is the Heaviside function that takes the value H(a) = 1 when a> 0, and
0 otherwise.
After the learning process, node j imitates the strategy of i (i.e., j adopts the innovation)
with probability:
Pj it ¼ ð1þ db
j
tÞRjt
ð1þ daitÞRit þ ð1þ dbjtÞRjt
ð6Þ
where δ is a parameter that represents the social pressure: the higher the value of δ, the greater
the influence exercised by the neighbors. Otherwise, node i imitates j’s strategy, which implies
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that the probability for node i to adopt the status quo is given by:
Pi jt ¼ 1 Pj it ¼ ð1þ da
i
tÞRit
ð1þ dbjtÞRjt þ ð1þ daitÞRit
ð7Þ
Topologies
In order to model different types of organizations and social system’s structures, we consider
several network topologies that represent the nodes and connections of the system being simu-
lated. In particular, we have dealt with the following types of graphs:
• Hierarchical graphs are networks in which any two nodes are connected by exactly one sim-
ple path. In this work, we will use regular hierarchical graphs, in which any intermediate
node has a higher-level neighbor (its upper-neighbor) andM lower-level neighbors (its lower-
neighbors). Therefore, the degree of an intermediate node i is ki =M+1. In addition, leaf
nodes do not have lower-neighbors but only upper-neighbor (kl = 1), and one node (the top-
node) does not have upper-neighbor but only lower-neighbors (kb =M). The number of
lower-neighborsM is called degree of branching.
• In lattice graphs the nodes are disposed in the vertex of a tiling and connected to the k closest
nodes. We will use square lattices with constant degree ki = 4, 8 i 2 I. The characteristic dis-
tance between two nodes is proportional to the network size.
• Erdös-Rényi (ER) networks are random graphs in which the probability p for any pair of
nodes to be connected is uniform. They are characterized by a binomial degree distribution
Pðki ¼ kÞ ¼ N  1
k
 !
pkð1 pÞN1k , which tends to a Poisson distribution for large networks
Pðki ¼ kÞ ! ðNpÞ
keNp
k! . [19]
• Scale-free networks are graphs whose degree distribution follows a power law P(ki = k) =
ck−γ, resulting in a small number of highly connected (i.e., very influential) nodes: the hubs.
In particular, we will use the Barabási-Albert (hereafter, BA) algorithm [20] to generate
the networks.
• Stars are particular cases of hierarchical graphs without intermediate nodes. They consist of
a central node (the hub, khub = N−1) connected to all other nodes, which have only that con-
nection (ki = 1).
• Complete graphs are networks in which every pair of nodes are directly connected by a link.
The degree of any node is ki = N−1
Results
According to section Initial conditions, ρ initial adopters were randomly distributed among a
population of N−ρ supporters of the status quo. After that, the dynamics of the adoption pro-
cess was run. The simulations were stopped when the number of active nodes (i.e., agents with
non-zero probability of changing opinion) vanished. The results shown below were obtained
by averaging over a large number (typically 104) of different initial conditions and
network realizations.
Global consensus is finally reached for all the topologies studied, that is, for each simulation,
the innovation is either accepted or rejected by all the agents bringing the system to a frozen
state. Consequently, for a given set of parameter values, the fraction of realizations α in which
the innovative method has been finally adopted represents the probability of adoption for the
The Role of the Organization Structure in the Diffusion of Innovations
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innovative method or technology. In Fig 1, we plot this fraction α versus the average initial per-
formance of the new method R, where each point represents the numerical result averaged
over 104 different network realizations. Without loss of generality, the average initial perfor-
mance of the status quo was fixed to R = 1, therefore, R/R = R, which means that R repre-
sents the improvement in performance of the new method. Different symbols and curves refer
to the different structures studied: hierarchical, lattice, ER, BA, star and complete. Other pa-
rameters are indicates in the figure.
Firstly, to study the influence of the degree distribution on the dynamics, let us focus our at-
tention in the first four topologies: hierarchical, lattice, ER and BA, whose networks realiza-
tions were constructed with the same mean connectivity hki* 4. As shown, the regular graphs
Fig 1. Acceptance probability versus the performance of the innovation. Fraction of realizations in which the innovative method has been finally
adopted as a function of the initial performance of the newmethod R* for six different types of networks: hierarchical, lattice, Erdös-Rényi, Barabási-Albert,
star and complete. Left panels correspond to systems of N = 103 agents while the right panel to N = 104. Upper panels correspond to the case of a number of
initial adopters ρ = 10, while the bottom panel to ρ = 100. Other values are R = 1, δ = 0.5,m = 0.5,  R*, σ = N−1. Each point is averaged over 104
network realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126076.g001
The Role of the Organization Structure in the Diffusion of Innovations
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(hierarchical and lattice) show higher acceptance probabilities than the complex networks (ER
and BA) and, in turn, ER networks show higher success probabilities than BA graphs. In con-
clusion, for a given mean connectivity, increasing degree heterogeneity decreases the likelihood
that the proposal will be accepted. Furthermore, comparing the two top panels, it can be ob-
served that the size of the system does not have a significant influence on the acceptance proba-
bility. Nevertheless, in heterogeneous and star graphs, large system sizes show lower ratios of
acceptance. Regarding the effect of the seed size, as can be seen by comparing the curves in the
bottom panel which those shown in the up-left panel, the increase of the number of initial
adopters has a positive influence on the success probability. Comparing the three panels, we
see that it is the amount of initials adopters ρ, not its fraction, that determines the success prob-
ability. This is due to the fact that achieving a critical mass of adopters in early stages is key to
the success of the innovation. This result has important implications because it indicates that
the efforts required to spread an innovation are independent of the size of the system.
Each panel of Fig 2 represents, for each of the different topologies considered, the time
needed to reach global consensus, that is, the number of dynamical steps until all the agents of
Fig 2. Consensus time versus versus the performance of the innovation. Number of steps needed to reach a consensus (either to accept or reject the
innovation) as a function of the the initial new method’s performance for the six different topologies considered. By comparing this panels from the curves
shown in Fig 1, it can be observed that the values of R* corresponding to the maximum consensus times match the values of R* for which P(acceptance)*
0.5. Other values are N = 1000, R = 1, ρ = 10, δ = 0.5,m = 0.5,  R*, σ = N−1. Each point is averaged over 104 network realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126076.g002
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the system shared the same opinion about the innovation. For each structure of the networks
of contacts we see how a peak in the transition time is revealed, signaling the existence of a
phase transition between the two different final states. In fact, by comparing these results with
those shown in the upper-left panel of Fig 1, it can be observed that the values of the innovation
performance R corresponding to the maximum consensus time (the peaks of Fig 2) match the
values of R for which the acceptance probability has intermediate values (transitions in Fig 1).
This is because, while for low values of R the proposal is rejected in the initial phases and for
high values of R it is accepted in most interactions, for values of R close to the transition the
probability for individuals to accept the proposal takes intermediate values, causing fluctua-
tions which in turn slow down the convergence to the final state.
Regarding the effect of the learning process on the opinion dynamics, the left panel of Fig 3
represents the acceptance probability P(acceptance) versus the learning ratio parameterm for
the six different topologies considered. According to the results showed in Fig 1, the initial
performance of the innovation R for each topology is chosen so that P(acceptance)* 0.5
form = 0.5, being R = 1.55, 2.2, 3.3, 4.5, 35, 155 for the hierarchical, lattice, Erdös-Rényi,
Barabási-Albert, star and complete graphs respectively. As shown, the more information ex-
change, the greater the likelihood of acceptance of the innovation. The first four kinds of net-
works (hierarchical, lattice, ER and BA) were made up with the same mean connectivity
hki* 4. Among these topologies, regular networks (hierarchical and lattice) show smoother
transitions than complex graphs (ER and BA), which means that degree heterogeneity in-
creases the sensitivity to the learning process, while regular structures are more robust. Fur-
thermore, star structures are less sensitive to the learning ratio. On the other hand, with respect
to the influence of social pressure on the dynamics, the right panel of Fig 3 represents, for the
Fig 3. Acceptance probability versus learning ratio and social pressure. Fraction of realizations in which the innovation has been adopted P
(acceptance) versus the learning ratiom (left panel) and versus the social pressure parameter δ (right panel) for the six different types of networks studied.
The value of R* is chosen so that P(acceptance)* 0.5 form = 0.5, being R* = 1.55, 2.2, 3.3, 4.5, 35, 155 for the hierarchical, lattice, Erdös-Rényi, Barabási-
Albert, star and complete graphs respectively. Other values are N = 1000, R = 1, ρ = 10, δ = 0.5,  R*, σ = N−1. Each point is averaged over 104 different
realizations. See the main text for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126076.g003
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same initial performance values R, the fraction of realizations in which the innovation has
been adopted as a function of the social pressure parameter δ for the different social structures
considered. As can be observed, social pressure makes it harder for the innovation to spread re-
gardless of the structure of the network, which is a consequence of the fact that, according to
Eqs 6–7, the imitation probability decreases with increasing social pressure.
Let us now focus on the impact of restrictions on interactions between agents. According to
formula Eq (2), two agents can interact with each other by exchanging knowledge and methods
only if a principle of minimal trust is satisfied, namely, if the absolute value of the performance
difference between both agents is lower than a threshold . Fig 4 represents the probability of
acceptance of the innovation as a function of the parameter ; each panel plots the results for a
given value of the innovation performance value R, while each symbol represents each of the
different topologies considered. As can be observed, all the curves are consistent with a step
Fig 4. Acceptance probability versus the interaction threshold. Fraction of realizations in which the innovation has been adopted as a function of the
performance difference threshold  beyond which two nodes do not interact with each other by exchanging knowledge and exchanging methods, for the six
different topologies studied and different values of the initial performance of the innovation R* = 2, 3, 5, 10, 150. Other values are N = 1000, R = 1, ρ = 10, δ =
0.5,m = 0.5, σ = N−1. Each point is averaged over 104 network realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126076.g004
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function centered at R−R = R−1, which means that, although individual performances
(Ri;R

i ) may vary due to the learning process, the threshold  has no influence on the final state
provided that the minimum trust principle is satisfied at the initial state.
Regarding the effect of connectivity on the opinion dynamics, the left and center panels of
Fig 5 show the acceptance probability as a function of the initial performance of the innovative
method for different values of the mean connectivity hki. The left panel corresponds to Bara-
bási-Albert graphs and the center panel to Erdös-Rényi networks. As shown, increased connec-
tivity hinders the diffusion of the innovation, which is a consequence of the fact that social
pressure increases with increasing the number of contacts and therefore, in the first states, the
probability for an agent to accept the innovation. In the same way, the right panel of Fig 5 stud-
ies the influence of the degree of branchingM (i.e., the number of lower-neighbors of an inter-
mediate node) on the acceptance probability in the hierarchical structures. The curves show
the fraction of realizations in which the innovative method has been adopted as a function of
the initial new method’s performance R for different values ofM. As illustrated in the figure,
increasing the degree of branching implies a decrease in the probability of the new method
being adopted, as a consequence of the increase in social pressure caused by the increase
of contacts.
Discussion
Although the main aim of this work is to study the dynamics of the diffusion of innovations,
this paper can be useful for understanding the adoption as a problem of opinion formation in
human groups. The diffusion of innovations in markets takes time because not all individuals
adopt at the same time, where adoption means that individuals purchase or use the innovation.
Within the organization, when the adoption of an innovation involves the generalized use of it
among all members the diffusion process will be affected by how the collective decision process
is structured and managed. The literature on public opinion [21–23] describe this forming as
the result of a process of influences of some people over others, using unidirectional means of
influence (for example, mass media) or multiple directional ones (for example, social
Fig 5. Influence of the connectivity on the acceptance probability. Fraction of realizations in which the innovative method has been adopted versus the
initial performance of the innovation R* for different values of the mean connectivity hki (left and center panel) and for different values of the degree of
branchingM (right panel). Left panel corresponds to Barabási-Albert networks, center panel to Erdös-Rényi graphs and right panel to hierarchical structure.
Other values are N = 1000, R = 1, ρ = 10, δ = 0.5,m = 0.5,  R*, σ = N−1. Each point is averaged over 104 network realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126076.g005
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networks). In some scenarios all individuals have the same capacity to exert influence while in
others there are opinion leaders with a greater level of influence than anyone else [24].
According to this approach, this paper belongs to the studies that analyze the dissemination
process of an opinion, using computer simulation of mathematical models of interpersonal in-
fluences in networks with nodes and lines of communication linking these nodes. In the con-
text of our work the opinion-formation ends up building a consensus, whether favorable or
not, around an innovation that arises at some particular points in the organization. Each per-
son in the organization has attached a likelihood of accepting the innovation which increases
with the positive externalities (which are attributed to network effects [25], coordination games
[26], learning from others [27], social pressure [28] and trust [29]) resulting from the pressure
to adopt a favorable opinion exerted by the members that had opted for that favorable position
previously, capability to learn about de alternatives, and with economic value of the innovation.
Our paper uses the same methodology of simulating mathematical models of interpersonal in-
fluences as [30] on public opinion formation. The authors assume that some individuals have
different influence than the others (opinion leaders and followers); the probability of staying to
one opinion is either zero or one; no change of opinion is contemplated; and the networks that
determine the mutual influences are formed at random. In our study, all individuals are equal
(although the model can incorporate influential asymmetries); the probabilities of supporting
one opinion or another are between zero and one; people can change their status, either for or
against, between one iteration and the next; the relative value of the innovation is included as a
determining factor for the likelihood of support; people learn from others about economic
value of alternatives giving heterogeneity; and the networks in which diffusion occurs respond
to different structures commonly found in the market o real organizations as business firms. So
far organizations and organization structures are viewed as institutions for solving coordina-
tion and motivation problems [31], and as tools for creating, transferring and using knowledge
[32]. Our paper also demonstrates the relevance of the formal structure of a social system in en-
abling the assimilation of proposals for change and innovative initiatives, i.e. as determinant of
social systems’ innovation capacity.
Summary and concluding remarks
The diffusion of innovation, that is, the study of patterns of how new ideas or technologies
spread throughout a community is a topic of interest in many fields, including economics, soci-
ology, market research and politics. In this paper we have studied the probability for a proposal
to be accepted by different collectives. Different communities are modeled through different
topologies of the contact network, and the process is studied through an agent based model
whose inter individual interactions mimic both the learning process and the acceptance or re-
jection of the proposal.
Our results show that the structure of the network of contacts has a strong influence on the
innovation diffusion, being more difficult for a proposal to be accepted when the connectivity
of agents is heterogeneously distributed. We have shown that the learning process plays a posi-
tive role in the diffusion, being heterogeneous structures more sensitive to the lack of informa-
tion exchange. We have also studied the effect of social pressure on the acceptance dynamics,
showing that social pressure hinders innovation spreading irrespective of the collective struc-
ture. Finally, we have shown that networks with high average connectivity obstruct the diffu-
sion of innovation.
These results are of interest for understanding how different factors influence the diffusion
and acceptance of a technological, technical or legislative proposal in different communities.
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